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Crumbs of Comfort: WƌĞŐŶĂŶĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚƵƐŽĨ ?tŽƌŬĞƌ ? ƵŶĚĞƌh>Ăǁ ?Ɛ&ƌĞĞDŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ
Provisions 
Case C-507/12 Jessy Saint Prix v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Judgment of the Court 
of Justice of the EU, (First Chamber), 19 June 2014  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Jessy Saint Prix v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
1
 the Court of justice of the EU (CJEU) 
has ruled that an EU migrant who gives up work or seeking work because of the physical constraints 
of the late stages of pregnancy and the afƚĞƌŵĂƚŚŽĨĐŚŝůĚďŝƌƚŚĐĂŶƌĞƚĂŝŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨ ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌ ? ?/Ŷ
order to do so, she must return to work or find another job within a reasonable period after the 
birth of her child.  In determining whether the period that has elapsed between childbirth and 
staƌƚŝŶŐǁŽƌŬĂŐĂŝŶŵŝŐŚƚďĞƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐ ?ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ? ?ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽƵƌƚƐƐŚŽƵůĚƚĂŬĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨĂůůŽĨ
the specific circumstances of the case as well as national rules on the duration of maternity leave.   
dŚĞĐĂƐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ:hďǇƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ^Ƶpreme Court, raises a number of important 
issues concerning EU worker status, equal treatment between men and women and protection 
against pregnancy discrimination under EU law against the backdrop of the rise of precarious work. 
Furthermore, its origin as a UK case is of particular interest due to the coalition ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
welfare reforms and recent statements regarding plans to curb EU migration and to further restrict 
welfare benefits to EU migrants.   
 
2. THE FACTS AND CASE HISTORY 
The claimant, a French national and qualified teacher, arrived in the UK in 2006 and worked for 
eleven months as a teaching assistant. Having enrolled on a PG Certificate in Education in September 
2007, she became pregnant and withdrew from the course in February 2008. Her baby was due in 
early June 2008. She sought work as a secondary school teacher and registered with an employment 
agency which, unable to place her in a post commensurate with her qualifications, provided her with 
a succession of posts in nursery schools. In March 2008 when she was almost six months pregnant, 
she stopped this work as caring for young children had become too strenuous.  Instead she looked 
for part-time work and, as none was available, she made a claim for income support (IS), a benefit 
which may be granted to certain categories of people whose income is below a defined threshold. 
Women who are pregnant or who have recently given birth may be eligible for IS, in particular 
during the period surrounding childbirth. As she was now 11 weeks away from her expected week of 
confinement (EWC) ?DƐ^ĂŝŶƚWƌŝǆ ?Ɛ claim for IS  was supported by her GP.2  For those who do not 
habitually reside in the UK, eligibility for IS is dependent on the ĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ ?Ɛability to show that she 
ŚĂƐĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨ ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨDirective 2004/38/EC  ?ŚĞƌĞŝŶĂĨƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ
                                                            
1
 Case C-507/12, judgment of 19
th
 June 2014, nyr. 
2
 11 weeks before the EWC is the earliest point at which the maternity leave period may commence under UK 
provisions - Maternity and Parental Leave, etc. Regulations 1999, reg. 4(2).  
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ŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?3 which provides EU citizens and their family members with certain qualified 
free movement rights. On 4
th
 May 2008 Ms Saint Pƌŝǆ ?Ɛ claim was refused on the grounds that she 
did not have a right to reside because she was no longer working and could not retain the status of 
worker because she had voluntarily chosen to leave the labour market. Under the relevant UK 
legislation,
4
 Ms ^ĂŝŶƚWƌŝǆǁĂƐĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚĂƐ ?ĂƉĞƌƐŽŶĨƌŽŵĂďƌŽĂĚ ?ĂŶĚǁĂƐ ?ƚŚƵƐ ?ŶŽƚĚĞĞŵĞĚƚŽďĞĂ
worker for the purposes of the Citizenship Directive. Her child was born prematurely and she 
resumed work on a full-time basis in August 2008, just three months after the birth.    
In late 2008 Ms Saint Prix appealed against the decision to refuse her claim for income support and 
her appeal was originally upheld by the First Tier Tribunal. However, the Secretary of State lodged a 
subsequent appeal against that decision which was upheld by the Upper Tribunal on 7 May 2010 and 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal.
5
  The case was heard by the Supreme Court in October 2012 and a 
request was made for a preliminary ruling by the CJEU
6
 to consider the following questions:  
1. Is the rŝŐŚƚŽĨƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞĐŽŶĨĞƌƌĞĚƵƉŽŶĂ ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?ŝŶƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŽ
be interpreted as applying only to those 
i) in an existing employment relationship, 
ii) at least in some circumstances) seeking work, or 
iii) covered by the extensions in article 7(3), or is the Article to be interpreted as not 
ƉƌĞĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƉĞƌƐŽŶƐǁŚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶ ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? 
 
2. i) If the latter, does it extend to a woman who reasonably gives up work, or seeking work, 
because of the physical constraints of the late stages of pregnancy (and the aftermath of   
childbirth)? 
ii) /ĨƐŽ ?ŝƐƐŚĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŽƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ ?ƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĞŶŝƚŝƐƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ
for her to do so? 
 
ĞĨŽƌĞĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ:h ?ƐƌƵůŝŶŐŝŶmore detail, it is worth noting the wholly precarious position in 
which migrant women who are unable to claim income support for the eight weeks surrounding the 
expected date of confinement find themselves under UK law. This was acknowledged by Lady Hale 
who, in setting out the relevant UK law applicable to pregnant women, noted that a woman who is 
ďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞĚĂƚĞĂƚǁŚŝĐŚƐŚĞŝƐĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚĂƐ ?actively seeking work ?7 and, thus eligible for 
:ŽďƐĞĞŬĞƌ ?ƐůůŽǁĂŶĐĞbut who has not yet passed the two weeks following the birth during which 
she is statutorily prevented from working,
8
    
 ?ǁithout other sources of income (including statutory maternity pay and other social 
security benefits for which some but not all pƌĞŐŶĂŶƚǁŽŵĞŶĂƌĞĞůŝŐŝďůĞ ? ?will be left 
destitute unless income support is available.
9
 
                                                            
3
 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member, OJ 2004 
L 158, p. 77, and corrigenda OJ 2004 L 229, p. 35, and OJ 2005 L 197, p. 34. 
4
 The Social Security (Incapacity for Work) (General) Regulations 1995, regulation 21AA. 
5
 Saint-Prix v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2011] EWCA Civ 806. 
6
 Under Article 45 TFEU. 
7
 Specifically 6 weeks before the expected date of confinement. 
8
 By virtue of regulation 14 of the Social Security (Incapacity for Work) (General) Regulations 1995. 
9
 Judgment of the Supreme Court [2012] UKSC 49, at para 4. 
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The questions posed by the Court are therefore essential in clarifying the extent of the obligation 
owed by a host member state to an EU migrant who for reasons related to pregnancy and maternity 
is temporarily unable to work: a situation that can only apply to women. This goes straight to the 
heart of the application of the fundamental general principle of equal treatment between men and 
women which would amount to little more than a meaningless platitude if ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚŽĨƉƉĞĂů ?Ɛ
judgment in the current case were allowed to stand.  
 
3. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION  
In formulating its responses to the questions referred, the CJEU considered the circumstances in 
which EU citizens who have previously been employed in the host Member State retain the status of 
worker, and consequently their eligibility for benefits including IS. Article 7(3) of the CŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?
Directive provides that a person retains the status of worker in certain circumstances, i.e. if they are 
 ?ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌŝůǇƵŶĂďůĞƚŽǁŽƌŬĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨĂŶŝůůŶĞƐƐŽƌĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚ ? ?Žƌ ?in recorded involuntary 
unemployment ?ĂŶĚƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌĞĚĂƐ a job-seeker with the relevant employment office (subject to 
certain further conditions) or undertaking vocational training related to their prior employment. The 
Directive makes no reference to a temporary inability to work due to the physical constraints of 
pregnancy and/or the aftermath of childbirth, nor does it state whether the list of circumstances is 
exhaustive (as argued by the UK Government). The Court, drawing on its earlier jurisprudence in a 
long line of employment cases,
10
 ǀĞĞƌĞĚĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐƚŚĞ ?ŝůůŶĞƐƐŽƌĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƚŽDƐ
^ĂŝŶƚWƌŝǆ ?ƐĐĂƐĞĂƐ ?pregnancy must be clearly distinguished from illness, in that pregnancy is not in 
any way comparable with a pathological condition ? ?11   
The Court went on to state that the Citizenship Directive could not in itself limit the scope of the 
concept of  ?worker ? which, within the meaning of free movement of persons as provided by Article 
45 TFEU, must be interpreted broadly.
12
 ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ? ?classification as a worker under Article 45 
TFEU, and the rights deriving from such status, do not necessarily depend on the actual or 
continuing existence of an employment relationship ? ?13 dŚƵƐ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐŝŵƉŽƐĞĚŽŶĂǁŽŵĂŶ ?Ɛ
ability to engage in work due to the effects of pregnancy and childbirth do not, in principle, deprive 
ŚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨ ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?d&h ?14 Furthermore, her temporary non-
availability on the labour market  ?does not mean that she has ceased to belong to that market 
during that period, provided she returns to work or finds another job within a reasonable period 
after confinement ? ?15 In assessing ǁŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚĂŵŽƵŶƚƚŽĂ ?ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ŝŶƐƵĐŚ
circumstances, national courts should take account of the specific circumstances of each case and 
the applicable national rules on the duration of maternity leave in accordance with Article 8 of the 
                                                            
10
 Up to and including C 32/93 Webb v EMO Air Cargo [1994] ECR I-03567. 
11
 CJEU judgment in Saint Prix, at 29. 
12
 Ibid at 32 and 33.   
13
 Ibid at 37. 
14
 Ibid at 40. 
15
 Ibid at 41. 
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Pregnant Workers Directive
16
 which provides for a continuous period of maternity leave of at least 
14 weeks long duration, 2 weeks of which must be given compulsorily around the time of the birth. 
Finally, the Court agreed with the ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐƐƵďŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĂŶ EU migrant who gave up work in 
the host state due to pregnancy and thus risked losing her status as a worker would be deterred 
from exercising her right to freedom of movement.
17
 It then went on to consider the special 
protection guaranteed for women in relation to pregnancy noting that, in the calculation of the five 
ǇĞĂƌ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞŚŽƐƚƐƚĂƚĞǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ
residence, Article 16(3) of the Citizenship Directive allows for a continuous absence of up to 12 
ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?for important reasons such as pregnancy and childbirth ? ?18 Applying the same reasoning, a 
temporary absence from the labour market due to pregnancy and childbirth  ?cannot, a fortiori, result 
in that woman losing her status as a worker. ?19   
As a consequence of its analysis, the Court held that the answer to the questions referred was, 
that Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a woman who gives up work, or 
seeking work, because of the physical constraints of the late stages of pregnancy and the 
ĂĨƚĞƌŵĂƚŚŽĨĐŚŝůĚďŝƌƚŚƌĞƚĂŝŶƐƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨ ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌ ? ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĂƚĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?
provided she returns to work or finds another job within a reasonable period after the birth 
of her child.
20
 
The case will now return to the Supreme Court for its final judgment. 
 
4. ANALYSIS 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although welcomed due to its confirmation of the status of migrant women workers who 
temporarily stop work due to pregnancy, the circumstances surrounding this case and, in some 
respects the :h ?ƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚitself, throw a spotlight on a particularly inimical corner of EU law 
which somehow appears to have developed without regard to the fact that a large proportion of the 
European labour market consists of women of childbearing age. ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ
provides some assurance that women migrants who find themselves in the unfortunate 
ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚǁŝůůďĞĂďůĞƚŽƌĞƚĂŝŶ ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞconfirms 
the fact that under the EU market order pregnancy and care-giving is commodified and found to be 
of little or no value.
21
 By focussing exclusively on the impact of the woman ?ƐĂďƐĞŶĐĞon the labour 
market, the Court avoided confronting what the effect would be on her and/or her child in the event 
                                                            
16
 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth 
or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC), 
OJ 1992 L 348, p. 1. 
17
 CJEU Judgment at 44. 
18
 Ibid at 45. 
19
 Ibid at 46. 
20
 Ibid at 47. 
21
 See N. Busby, A Right to Care: Unpaid Care Work in European Employment Law (OUP, 2011) 
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that she was unable to return to work within a reasonable period following childbirth, perhaps for a 
reason related to the health and/or wellbeing of her child or due to a lack of suitable employment. In 
such circumstances she would, presumably, be subjected to withdrawal of her status as a worker 
and consequently the denial of any related means of subsistence and, ultimately, the possibility of 
deportation to her home state. Can this be seen as anything other than the exercise of a punitive 
measure in what would already be extremely difficult circumstances? The imposition of a pregnancy 
penalty seems particularly unfair given that its avoidance ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽĚĞƉĞŶĚŽŶƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇ
to secure employment within what is an increasingly precarious labour market, particularly for those 
who seek to combine unpaid care for a dependent child with paid employment. That it should be 
applied in circumstances where an EU migrant simply exercises her right to free movement, which is 
after all one of the founding principles of EU law, appears to be particularly unjust. 
It is worth noting that the relevance of this judgment is limited to a relatively small number of 
women as those who are already employed at the time that they temporarily cease work on the 
grounds of pregnancy will be protected from dismissal and will have a secured right to return under 
the rights conferred ďǇƚŚĞWƌĞŐŶĂŶƚtŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ.22 Furthermore, the majority of pregnant 
migrant workers in the UK will not be reliant on IS due to their eligibility for statutory maternity pay 
or maternity allowance. However, access to IS (and similar benefits in other Member States) will be 
of crucial importance to those who do not satisfy the relevant qualifying periods and other eligibility 
criteria for maternity pay or allowance which, given the increasing ŝŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶŝŶŐǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
employment in many sectors, are likely to comprise a growing number. Furthermore, that the 
judgment has application to a relatively small number of women does not of course make it any less 
important and arguably ŵĂŬĞƐƚŚĞh<'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƚĞŶĂĐŝƚǇŝŶĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐĂƐĞappear even more 
questionable. 
The circumstances surrounding Saint Prix relate to the gendered nature of the free movement 
provisions and their incremental interpretation by the Court over many years under which an 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐ depends almost exclusively on her direct market value. In its interpretation of the 
relevant provisions, the Court has consistently disregarded reproductive labour and associated care-
giving as non-economic activities.
23
 Against that backdrop it is hardly surprising that a migrant 
ǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƌĞƚĂŝŶǁŽƌŬĞƌƐƚĂƚƵƐĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĐŚŝůĚďŝƌƚŚǁŝůůĚĞƉĞŶĚ, not on the state of her health 
and wellbeing or that of her offspring nor on her financial stability, but on her ability to get back to 
work as soon as possible. Even the language deployed in this area of EU law (the Court refers to the 
claimant  ?ďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐ ?ƚŽƚŚĞůĂďŽƵƌŵĂƌŬĞƚŽĨƚŚĞŚŽƐƚ state24), betrays a lack of consideration of the 
often harrowing ůŝĨĞƐƚŽƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚůŝĞďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĐĂƐĞůĂǁ ?The only reference to the effects of 
pregnancy and childbirth ŝŶƚŚĞ:h ?ƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚarises in relation to their being the cause of an 
(inconvenient) absence from the labour market  W ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽDƐ^ĂŝŶƚWƌŝǆ ?ƐĂďƐĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵ
the labour market on the grounds of pregnancy ĂƐĂŶ ?interruption of her professional activity ? ?25  Of 
course this approach is supported by the legislative provision which brought the case before the 
Court in the first place. The omission of pregnancy as one of the specified grounds provided under 
                                                            
22
 Article 10. 
23
 Case 44/88 Achterberg-te Riele and others v Sociale Verzekeringsbank [1989] ECR 1963; Case C-31/90 
Johnson v Chief Adjudication Officer [1991] ECR I-3723; Case C-325/09 Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions v Dias [2010] 1 CMLR 112.  
24
 CJEU judgment, para 41.  
25
 Ibid, para 39. 
6 
 
Article 7(3) on which an individual requiring a temporary absence from work will be protected from 
the loss of worker status speaks volumes. The explicitly permitted grounds (illness, accident, 
involuntary unemployment and vocational training) are likely to have a narrower impact on a smaller 
number of individuals than the natural state of pregnancy which will affect most women at least 
once during the life cycle, yet it was the latter (exclusively female) ground that was apparently 
overlooked at the time that the Directive was drafted.
26
 
 
 
B. THE REASON FOR ABSENCE FROM THE LABOUR MARKET 
The Court ?ƐƌƵůŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉ Directive does not provide an exhaustive list of the 
circumstances in which worker status may be retained will no doubt prove useful in the 
development of arguments supporting claimants who have stopped work for reasons other than 
those specified in the Directive, but it is the treatment afforded to pregnancy and childbirth per se 
that is somewhat unsatisfactory.  By focussing almost exclusively on the free movement provisions 
of EU law, the Court avoided the deeper questions relating to the application of the principles of 
equal treatment and sex discrimination. In doing so, it could have made use of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights,
27
 ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?ŽĨǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ?quality between men and women must be 
ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay ? ?28Such questions were eloquently 
ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƐƵďŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ29 which raised a number of issues regarding the 
application and extent of the equal treatment principle in the free movement provisions. For 
example, in asserting that the denial of worker status to a female migrant for reasons related to 
pregnancy and childbirth would amount to direct discrimination without the need for a 
comparator,
30
 the clamant contested that,  
 ?Pregnancy is not just a lifestyle choice. Equal treatment encompasses the reasonable 
response of a working woman to the physical demands and limitations of late pregnancy and 
ĐŚŝůĚďŝƌƚŚ ?.31   
                                                            
26
 This omission is explained by Advocate General Wahl in his opinion as arising due to the codification of the 
case law by the Citizenship Directive which, at the stage that the Directive was drafted, had not considered the 
circumstances surrounding pregnancy-related absence. See A-G ?Ɛ opinion, paras 27 and 28.   
27
 /ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂůtĂŚů ?ƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?ĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚŽŶ ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨƐĞǆ
discrimination is considered in some detail and reference is made to Article 21 CFR - see A-' ?ƐKƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?ƉĂƌĂ
35. Article 33(2) CFR which provides for the reconciliation of family and professional life is a carefully-worded 
ĐŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ:h ?ƐĐĂƐĞůĂǁĂŶĚƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞŚĂǀŝŶŐ ? ?the right to protection from dismissal for a 
reason connected with maternity and the right to paid maternity leave and parental leave following the birth 
or adoption of a child.  
28
 Article 33(2) CFR, which provides for the reconciliation of family and professional life, avoids the possibility 
ƚŚĂƚŝƚƐ ?ĂŝŵƐŵŝŐŚƚďĞĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůĨƌŽŵŵĂƌŬĞƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂŶĚis a carefully-
worded codificĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ:h ?ƐĐĂƐĞůĂǁǁŚŝĐŚ refeƌƐƚŽĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞŚĂǀŝŶŐ ? ?ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵ
dismissal for a reason connected with maternity and the right to paid maternity leave and parental leave 
following the birth or adoption of a child. ? 
29
 In which (and in all subsequent hearings) she was ably supported by the intervention of the AIRE Centre. 
30
 C 32/93 Webb v EMO Air Cargo [1994] ECR I-03567 
31
 Supreme Court judgment, para 19. 
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Following this line of reasoning, pregnancy and the immediate aftermath of childbirth, as opposed to 
leaving the workplace to look after children,
32
 should be treated as a special case in decisions 
ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŽƌŬĞƌƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚďǇƚŚĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ
judgment which states, 
33
 
Only women can become pregnant and bear children. Thus in this respect they cannot be 
compared to men. Pregnancy is not to be equated with illness or disability. But unless 
special account is taken of pregnancy and childbirth, women will suffer comparative 
disadvantage in the workplace. There are also good reasons in health and social policy for 
allowing women to take a reasonable period of maternity leave without losing the 
advantages attached to their status as workers. This is different from leaving the workforce 
in order to look after children. Both men and women may do this and there is no sex 
discrimination involved in denying them both the status of worker for the time being. We do 
not see the sex discrimination argument as invalidating Article 7, but as indicating that it 
would be consistent with the fundamental general principles of EU law for the Court to 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?ƚŽŵĞĞƚƚŚŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
dŚĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽŚĞĂůƚŚand social policy echoes the approach taken by EU 
employment law under which legislative protection surrounding pregnancy finds its legal bases in 
both the health and safety and equal treatment provisions of the Treaties.
34
 In extending the status 
of worker to encompass temporary absence due to pregnancy and childbirth the CJEU, by contrast, 
takes no direct account of the social dimension but relies heavily on an economic rationale.
35
 Equal 
treatment is considered implicitly but only in relation to a comparison between the treatment 
afforded to a non-migrant and a migrant in relation to qualification for  ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐ and not in the 
context of the direct discrimination arising from the differential treatment received by Jessy Saint 
Prix compared to that which would have been applied to a sick ŵĂůĞŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞh< ?ƐƌƵůĞƐŽŶ
eligibility for IS.  
The long line of pregnancy discrimination cases which form an important part of the CJh ?Ɛ
jurisprudence on equal treatment in employment are referenced only in so far as they prohibit the 
analogy between sickness and pregnancy
36
 but those cases tell us so much more about the ŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽ ?ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƐĞ ?ƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽŶƉĂŝĚǁŽƌŬŽĨƉƌĞŐŶĂncy so that it is seen as what it is  W a 
natural condition which will nonetheless require some specific temporary adjustments to be made 
ƚŽƚŚĞǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐƵƐƵĂůǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƵŶĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞ
                                                            
32
 Case C-325/09 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Dias [2010] 1 CMLR 112.  
33
 Supreme Court judgment, para 21.  
34
 The Pregnant Workers Directive 92/85/EEC found its legal base in 118a EEC and was, thus, an instrument of 
health and safely law rather than employment protection. Its provisions are expressly referred to in Aricle 2(2) 
(c) of the Recast Equal Treatment Directive which is has, as its legal base Article 141 EEC (now Art 157 TFEU) 
which provides  ?ŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂůůŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ? any less favourable treatment of a woman related to pregnancy 
ŽƌŵĂƚĞƌŶŝƚǇůĞĂǀĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?(Directive 2006/54/2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation).  
35
 Despite the fact that the CŽƵƌƚ ?ƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐĂƐĞůĂǁƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐǁŽƌŬĞƌƐƚĂƚƵƐ recognises the relevance of 
factors other than the market value of the individual  W see, for example, Case 53/81 Levin v Secretary of State 
for Justice [1982] ECR 1035; Case 139/85 Kempf v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1986] ECR 1741; Case 39/86 
Lair v Universität Hannover [1988] ECR 3161. 
36
 CJEU judgment, para 29. 
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treatment.
37
 However, even this well-ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĂƌĞĂŽĨƚŚĞ:h ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƐŽŵĞ
unsatisfactory outcomes where market inactivity due to the possible effects of pregnancy and 
childbirth are concerned. In fact, if the free movement rights are compared with the case law 
relating to employment, an interesting anomaly can be identified by which migrant women who 
remain in employment are actually placed at a disadvantage to those who do not. Central to the 
employment case law is the temporal limitation by which the duration of pregnancy and the relevant 
ŵĂƚĞƌŶŝƚǇůĞĂǀĞƉĞƌŝŽĚĂŵŽƵŶƚƚŽĂ ?ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ďĞǇŽŶĚǁŚŝĐŚĂŶǇmedical problems which 
initially arose from pregnancy or childbirth will be subject to the same treatment as ordinary 
illness.
38
 A straightforward application of the Citizenship Directive to such circumstances reveals that 
a woman who does experience such health-related problems will be able to rely on the explicit 
inclusion of a temporary inability to work due to illness in retaining  ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
access to any relevant benefits) for the purposes of free movement law.  
 
C. THE RETURN TO WORK 
In his argument before the Supreme Court in the current case, the Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions emphasised ƚŚĞ ?risk ? that women will not return to work after they have had their 
babies.
39
 This assertion is not evidence-based and in the context of contemporary labour markets 
within which short-term and zero-hours contracts dominate seems very outdated. The increase in 
womĞŶ ?Ɛeconomic participation rates, regardless of life stage or family formation, has been 
accompanied by the advent of labour market flexibility as a key employment policy goal in both the 
UK and EU contexts.  For many women, the result of combining paid work in a flexible labour market 
with unpaid care for children and other dependents is subjection to high levels of instability, often 
through part-time and temporary working arrangements which are too often accompanied by low 
levels of protection and, in the case of zero-hours contracts, the absence of any regular guaranteed 
earnings. Despite the obvious difficulties experienced by an individual migrant worker in her 
attempts to sustain a means of supporting herself within such a volatile labour market, the resulting 
precariousness would, on the face of it, sit ǁĞůůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ?ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ?ďƌĞĂŬƐĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞĚďǇƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ?
of the Citizenship Directive.        
Those whose reasons for their absence from work accord directly with the provisions of Article 7(3) 
are not entitled to retain worker status indefinitely and application of the same condition to women 
who are unable to work due to pregnancy and childbirth actually reflects the reality of many 
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?/ƚŝs commonplace for women workers to leave jobs due to pregnancy and to 
seek new employment beyond a period of maternity leave. It is interesting that the high levels of 
mobility in and out of the labour market experienced by so many women during the years of family 
formation, which might even be seen as desirable by certain employers who are, thus, saved the 
trouble of having to adapt working practices to accommodate flexible working arrangements or to 
keep jobs open during the period of maternity leave, can so easily be used against a woman seeking 
                                                            
37
 The aim of the protection afforded to pregnancy under EU law has been articulated by the Court as being to 
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ ? ?ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞ ? ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĨŽƌŵĂů ?ĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇďǇƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐde facto inequalities which may arise in society 
ĂŶĚ ? ?ƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŽƌĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚĞĨŽƌĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůĐĂƌĞĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?see Case 
C-104/09 Alvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA [2010] ECR I-000, para 34. 
38
 Case C-394/96 Brown v Rentokil Ltd [1998] ECR I-4185. 
39
 Supreme Court, para 17. 
9 
 
to assert her free movement rights. A future practical difficulty will arise in cases where women who 
find themselves in the same position as the claimant in the current case are unable to secure paid 
work following a return to the labour market  W in such cases it is unclear whether they would be 
required to pay back any benefits received by virtue of retaining worker status  W although it is 
perhaps these circumstance that the Court had in mind when referring to the need for the relevant 
national court to ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞ ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ ?.40    
KŶĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĐƌƵŵďŽĨĐŽŵĨŽƌƚƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ:h ?ƐŚĂŶĚůŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĐĂƐĞůŝĞƐŝŶŝƚƐƵƐĞŽĨ 
Article 45 TFEU as the basis for its judgment, by which it is evident that the established case law 
ĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?ĂƌŝƐĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝŶƚĞƌƉ ĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ primary law.41 This disenables 
the restriction of the concept by secondary legislation and provides some assurance that the 
judgment is guaranteed. However, bǇĂƚƚĂĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞĚĞĞŵĞĚƚŽďĞ ?a 
reasonable period ? to the national rules permitted under Article 8 of the Pregnant Workers 
Directive,
42
 the Court clearly intends to restrict this period to the maternity leave period applicable 
in the host state.  Thus, the question of whether migrant workers will lose their status as workers 
when they fail to return to work for reasons related to care-giving remains unanswered as the 
 ?ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞƉĞƌŝŽĚ ? clearly would not extend to care-giving beyond the period of maternity leave 
applicable under national law. Of course, as noted by the Supreme Court, there is no reason why the 
provision of care should be confined solely to women migrants,
43
 so it would be helpful to see a 
ďƌŽĂĚĞŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƚŽƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ?ƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ?ĂƚƐŽŵĞƉŽŝŶƚ.  
This will, of course depend, on the referral of a case in which the central question relates to the 
status of unpaid care-giving under the free movement provisions. Given the preoccupation with paid 
work explicit in the legislative provision and the exclusion of considerations relating to the status of 
ƵŶƉĂŝĚĐĂƌĞƵŶĚĞƌƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?d&hĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐĂƌĞĂŽĨƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞƚŽĚĂƚĞ ?ŝƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞ
some time before the Court is confronted with such a case.
44
      
 
CONCLUSION 
dŚĞĚŝƐƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚƵƐĨĂƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ:h ?ƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚŝŶSaint Prix is not intended to 
detract from the victory rightly claimed by the claimant and those acting on her behalf.
45
 It is 
undeniable that tŚĞĐůĂƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŐĂŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐƌƵůŝŶŐŐŽĞƐƐŽŵĞǁĂǇŝŶĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
protection of pregnant women against discrimination in the exercise of their freedom of movement 
as EU workers. However, it does seem somewhat incongruous that, more than fifty years after the 
                                                            
40
 CJEU judgement, para 42. 
41
 CJEU judgment, paras 35-37. 
42
 Which provides that workers covered must be entitled to a continuous period of at least 14 weeks of 
maternity leave allocated either before or after confinement, in accordance with national practice. 
43
 See Judgment of the Supreme Court, para 21. 
44
 Although see Case C̻333/13 Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, judgment of the Court 11th November 2014, nyr, in 
which the CJEU held that EU law did not preclude legislation of a Member State under which nationals of other 
Member States do not have a right of residence under Directive 2004/38 are excluded from entitlement to 
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŶŽŶ-ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŽƌǇĐĂƐŚďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ?despite the fact that such benefits are granted to nationals of 
the host State who are in the same situation. The case concerned an EU migrant who had never worked in the 
host state and who was the sole carer of her pre-school aged son.   
45
 See Aire Centre Press Release, 19 June 2014, available: http://www.airecentre.org/news.php/140/cjeu-
judgment-in-saint-prix  
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free movement of persons was established as a founding principle of the EU and despite the 
substantial progress made in the recognition of the principle of equal treatment between women 
and men, in particular in the jurisprudence of the CJEU, pregnancy and childbirth still arise as 
ĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵ ?ƚŚĞŶŽƌŵ ? to such an extent that they are not expressly provided for as the possible 
cause of absence from the labour market in the same way as illness or injury.  The slow incremental 
development of the free movement provisions is particularly worrying at a time when the UK, along 
with other Member States, looks set to further restrict the access of EU migrants to social 
assistance,
46
 thus creating an even more hostile environment than that in which the Saint Prix case 
arose.    
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46
 See David Cameron ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƌĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞƚŚĞĨƌĞĞ
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨhůĂǁĂŶĚƚŽƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚhŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ?ĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ widely quoted in the press, for 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ?EU migrants in Britain will be stripped of benefits after twelve weeks, available: 
http://rt.com/uk/176344-eu-benefits-migrants-cuts/ ĂŶĚ ?Tories plan to deny EU migrants out-of-work 
benefits under universal credit, available: http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/nov/06/tories-deny-eu-
migrants-benefits-universal-credit 
 
